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INTRODUCTION

The 1976 car-bombing of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his American aide, Ronnie Moffitt, in Washington, D.C. has been called a "monstrous" 1 crime and "the most
heinous terrorist act ever carried out in the United States."'2 After

two years of intensive investigation by the Justice Department,
the FBI, and the United States Attorney's office, United States
officials believed that the assassination was ordered, if not by
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet himself, then by his friend and
trusted adviser, General Manuel Contreras. Contreras headed
*

M.A., Yale University, 1985; doctoral candidate in political science, Colum-

bia University.
1.

Statement by Judge Barrington D. Parker, Wash. Post, March 24, 1979, p.

All.
2. United States Economic Sanctions Against Chile, House Committee on
ForeignAffairs, 97th Congress, lst Sess. 73 (1982) (statement of Michael Tigar,
attorney for Isabel Letelier and Michael Moffitt).
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Chile's secret police, the Direccion de Intelligencia Nacional
(DINA). 3 Contreras apparently authorized his chief of operations,
Colonel Pedro Espinoza, to enlist two DINA agents, Armando
Fernandez and expatriate American Michael Vernon Townley, to
follow Letelier and assassinate him. Townley subsequently recruited several anti-Castro exiles to help him assemble, plant, and
detonate the car bomb.4 Later evidence indicated that Townley
orchestrated a similar car-bombing in Buenos Aires in 1974 that
killed General Carlos Prats Gonzales, former Commander-InChief of the Chilean Armed Forces, and his wife.5
As United States officials investigated Letelier's assassination,
they requested Chile's permission to question Townley. After the
United States had applied considerable pressure and Chile had
signed a secret agreement with United States prosecutors, 6 the
Chileans deported Townley to the United States in April 1978.
After being arrested, Townley turned "state's evidence" in a plea

3. For Chile analysts, the suspected involvement of the Pinochet regime in
Letelier's murder was unsurprising. Letelier had distinguished himself as a
leader of anti-junta Chilean exile forces, and by 1976 he posed a credible threat
to Pinochet. Once Foreign Minister, Defense Minister and Ambassador to the
United States under Marxist President Salvador Allende, Letelier had been banished by Pinochet in 1973 and when released a year later, chose to seek political
asylum in the United States. At his post at the leftist Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., Letelier campaigned against human rights violations in
his native country and lobbied to block aid to Chile. At the trial of the five
Cubans involved in the Letelier assassination, Senator George McGovern testified that conversations he held with Letelier in 1975 led him, in part, to vote for
the 1976 legislation cutting off military assistance and sales to Chile. Relus ter
Bek, a leading Dutch Social Democrat, testified that in 1976 Letelier made several trips to the Netherlands where he succeeded in convincing the Stevin group,
a large Dutch industrial concern, to abandon its proposed $62.5 million investment package in Chile. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1979, at A7.
4. Complete accounts of the Letelier assassination and investigation can be
found in JOHN DINGES & SAUL LANDAU, AsSASSINATION ON EMBASSY Row (1980)
and in TAYLOR BRANCH & EUGENE M. PROPPER, LABYRINTH (1982).
5. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1979, at A3.
6. The agreement, signed by Chilean Deputy Interior Minister Enrique Montero and United States Attorney E. Lawrence Barcella (for Earl J. Silbert) on
April 7, 1978, included the following:
1. That information obtained through the Letelier investigation with respect to actions by Chilean Nationals in the United States may be used to
investigate and prosecute violations of law in the United States;
2. That there will be no other use of this information by the United
States and it will be conveyed only to the Government of Chile to be used
by its investigators for possible prosecutions. ...
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bargaining arrangement.7 In September 1978, the State Department requested the formal extradition of Contreras, Espinoza,
and Fernandez. In August a federal grand jury had indicted the
three Chileans, along with the Cubans, for the Letelier assassination. The Chilean Supreme Court twice refused to comply with
the extradition request. The Court also refused to order a trial for
the three in Chile. (In July 1983, a United States federal magistrate rejected Argentina's bid to extradite Townley for his role in
the 1974 Buenos Aires car-bombing.)
The cases involving Orlando Letelier and Michael Townley
raise a number of questions about extradition and state-sponsored terrorism. As shown by the United States' failure to obtain
the three Chilean requestees (and Argentina's failure to obtain
Townley), extradition is an unreliable and thus inadequate means
to cope with state-sponsored terrorism. To deter such conduct
may call for greater inventiveness in identifying and implementing effective sanctions. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) seemingly offers an alternative to extradition and a remedy for acts of state-sponsored terrorism under its noncommercial
torts exception. This remedy, however, is uncertain in light of recent court decisions. The executive and Congress should reexamine the FSIA regarding political terrorism. (Additionally, because
lawyers sought to block Michael Townley's extradition to Argentina in part on "humanitarian" grounds, the "humanitarian exception" to extradition is considered. This Note argues that legislating such an exception is undesirable.)

II. EXTRADITION
A.

Normal Procedures

Extradition is the means by which one country surrenders an
individual to another country that has charged him with, or convicted him of, a crime. Most often countries use bilateral or multilateral extradition treaties." These treaties enumerate the of-

7. Townley agreed to plead guilty to charges of conspiracy to murder Letelier
and to supply information to United States prosecutors about the plot to kill
Letelier in exchange for a reduced prison sentence and a new identity. N.Y.

Times, April 28, 1978, at A4.
8. When the United States is the requested party, it may extradite only by
treaty. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982).
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fenses for which countries will grant extradition;9 they bar

extradition for "political offenses"' 0 and for offenses where the respective statute of limitations has run;" and they exempt nationals from extradition and subject them to local prosecution if nationality is the cause of their nonextradition. 1 2 Extradition
requests relating to persons not yet convicted of a crime must
contain the necessary evidence to justify an arrest and trial of the
person in the requested country.' 3 In such cases, the requesting
4
party must show evidence.'

In the United States and other states, municipal statutes control international extradition. Ordinarily, a judge or magistrate
holds a hearing to decide the requesting state's case for extradition. 1 5 The hearing is not a trial on the merits. A United States
magistrate, for example, must determine whether an extradition
treaty is in force between the United States and the requesting

9. E.g., Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and the
Republic of Argentina, Jan. 21, 1972, art. 2, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510.
However, Extradition Treaty with Italy, October 13, 1983, United States-Italy,
art. 11(1), S.Treaty Doc. No. 39, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1984), simply requires
that for extradition the offense be punishable in both Italy and the United
States by a minimum of one year imprisonment. No list of offenses is enumerated. Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States, May 4, 1978, art. 2(3), 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, also
provides for this double criminality in abstracto.
10. In fact, each of the United States' 96 bilateral extradition treaties has a
political offense exception.
11. E.g., Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Dec. 22, 1931, art. 5, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S.
849, 163 L.N.T.S. 59.
12. E.g., Extradition Treaty betwe6n the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Norway, June 9, 1977, art. 4, 31 U.S.T. 5619, T.I.A.S. No. 9697; also,
see Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form
of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance, signed at Washington, Feb. 2, 1971, art. 5, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No.
8413. However, Convention on Extradition between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the State of Israel, art. 4, Dec.
10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476, does not exempt nationals of either
State from extradition.
13. E.g., Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and
Canada, Dec. 3, 1971, art. 9(3), 27 U.S.T. 983, T.I.A.S. No. 8237.
14. E.g., Treaty between the United States and Chile Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, April 17, 1900, art. 1, 32 Stat. 1850, T.S. 407; Treaty on
Extradition between the United States of America and Australia, art. VI, May 8,
1976, 27 U.S.T. 957, T.I.A.S. No. 8234.
15. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 943 (1968).
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state; whether the person before him is the individual for whom
extradition is sought; whether there is probable cause to believe
the offense occurred and the defendant committed an extraditable offense; and whether the political offense exception or other
exceptions apply.. 6 A Chilean magistrate must also verify the

identity of the accused and determine whether the offense is extraditable. To recommend extradition, however, the magistrate

must also establish, according to article 647(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, whether the accused committed the offense. 117 This requirement, more rigorous than establishing "prob-

able cause," mirrors the stringent standard of proof needed for an
accused (inculpado) to stand trial in Chile.18 These evidentiary

standards are indirectly recognized in article 1 of the 1902 extradition treaty between the United States and Chile.'
B.

American Extradition Efforts

On May 9, 1979, Judge Israel Borquez, head of the Chilean Supreme Court, formally denied the extradition of Contreras, Espinoza, and Fernandez. An appeal to the full chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court produced the same result, as well as a
declaration that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation of the Letelier assassination in Chile. Although LeteHer's murder was clearly political assassination, the Court never
applied the "political offense" exception, the grounds that have
defeated many bids to extradite terrorists. Rather, the Court dis-

16. Id. at 944-45.
17. Id.
18. According to Article 274 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure, in
order to declare an inculpado a processado or reo (one who is committed for
trial), the existence of the crime must be proven and there must be "wellgrounded presumptions" that the inculpado participated in the crime as author,
accomplice, or accessory. Although these presumptions are not meant to constitute full proof, according to Article 488 of the Chilean Code of Criminal Procedure, they must be: (1) based on actual and proven facts and not on other presumptions, whether legal or juridical; (2) numerous and serious; (3) precise, such
that one presumption could not lead to several conclusions; (4) direct, such that
they lead logically and naturally to the fact deduced from them; and (5) in
agreement with one another, so that the facts are interrelated and so that all
lead, without any counterindication whatsoever, to the same conclusion that the
fact in question existed. Codigo de Procedimiento Penal, Libro II, 89, 131
(1970).
19. See supra note 14.
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missed all evidence that the United States prosecutors obtained
from Michael Townley as inadmissible, since Chilean law did not
recognize the plea bargain. The Supreme Court ruled that
"Townley's confession

. . .

was the result of promises and coer-

cion prohibited by Chilean Law of Criminal Procedure and, consequently ... has no probative value. This is what the Chilean

courts must examine in conformity with Article 647(3) of that law
and Article 1 of the 1902 Extradition Treaty between Chile and
the United States.

' 20

From such a position, the Court concluded

that the remaining evidence in the extradition request was
insufficient.
The Chilean court's presumably predictable denial of extradition has led some observers to criticize the United States extradition request as naive or insincere. Dinges and Landau, for example, charge United States officials with accepting the fiction of the
Chilean judiciary's independence and with believing "that the
DINA assassins were somehow separate from the Chilean government

-

as if.

.

. Fernadez, Espinoza, and Contreras has commit-

ted the crime as individuals not subject to [General] Pinochet's
command."21 They also suggest that the request was governed by
national security considerations, notwithstanding United States
22
determination to proceed with the extradition request:

The Letelier assassination placed the United States on the horns of
a dilemma: solving the murder carried with it the real threat of
discrediting and possibly dethroning Pinochet ....

The Carter ad-

ministration was confronted inexorably with the choice between
punishing the Chilean government for perpetrating an act of international terrorism and protecting Pinochet. 23
20. Decision of the Full Chamber of the Chilean Supreme Court Extradition
(unofficial translation, United States Department of State) 34.
21. DINGES & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 391.
22. Asked before filing for extradition if a trial of the three in Chile would
suffice, Attorney General Griffin Bell responded, "It wouldn't be acceptable to
me. We are talking about our own internal affairs." NEWSWEEK, Aug. 14, 1978,
p.31. When Contreras's lawyers threatened to release damaging information
about the State Department and the CIA if the United States went ahead with
extradition, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Frank McNeil defied the threat
with expletives. BRANCH & PROPPER, supra note 4, at 584. In addition, following
Judge Borquez's initial decision, United States Ambassador to Chile George
Landau privately threatened Chilean officials with diplomatic sanctions and restrictions on United States private bank loans if Chile did not extradite the
three Chilean intelligence officers on appeal. These threats were not carried out.
23. DINGES & LANDAU, supra note 4, at 392.
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Pursuing extradition, in this view, allowed the United States to
escape the supposed dilemma: a grant of extradition would have
been a welcome, if unexpected, result, while a denial would enable
the United States to present itself as the aggrieved party, as it
did, but without having to jeopardize bilateral relations.24
These criticisms are useful - naivete or political expedience
may indeed motivate an extradition request - but in this case
they are exaggerated, according to those who handled the extradition request. Some United States officials did believe in the possibility of an independent, and presumably favorable ruling by the
Chilean Supreme Court, especially since Pinochet had tried to
distance himself from Contreras, had professed a desire to cooperate with the United States, and had already surrendered Townley.25 One prominent United States official was less hopeful from
24. In fact, at meetings after the Chilean Supreme Court decision of October
1979, virtually all United States officials present opposed sanctions affecting
their respective agency or departmental interests in Chile. (A brief exception
was a decision by the State Department Legal Adviser to denounce the 1902
United States-Chile extradition treaty - a decision later rescinded.) BRANCH &
PROPP.R, at supra note 4, at 593-94; 598-600. Then on Nov. 30, 1979, in response
to the Chilean Supreme Court rulings and Chile's ineffective, and apparently
insincere, two-year Letelier investigation, President Carter did authorize a series
of sanctions against Chile to "make clear, both to the Government of Chile and
to others throughout the world, that such acts of terrorism cannot be tolerated."
The measures included (1) a 25% reduction in the number of United States
Government personnel in Chile; (2) termination of the foreign military sales
pipeline to Chile; (3) elimination of the military group stationed at the United
States Embassy in Santiago; (4) suspension of Export-Import financing for
Chile; and (5) imposition of a hold on further investment guarantees by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). In 1980, the Administration
also voted in the World Bank against a water supply project loan to Chile and
denied LAN-Chile's request for landing rights in Los Angeles. DEP'T ST. BULL.,
Jan. 1980 at 65-66 and Sept. 1980 at 73-74. However, it should be noted that
most of the sanctions authorized, like those threatened following the initial extradition denial (see supra note 22), either were never carried out, or served to
formalize existing policy. No United States embassy official in Santiago was recalled, for example, and those considered for recall included mapmakers from
the United States Geodesic Survey and AID officials who no longer had a program in Chile. As to formalizing existing policy, the United States Export-Import Bank and OPIC loan guarantees had been dormant since at least 1977.
France and Israel already had replaced the United States as Chile's military
supplier. Wash. Post, Jan. 2, 1980, at Al.
25. After the extradition request was filed, these calculations became less
tenable. Ambassador Francis McNeil, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
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the start. According to him, "There was no way he [Pinochet]
would let Contreras go."'26 If surrendered, Contreras could have,
as he threatened, come forward with politically fatal information
about the Chilean leader. In addition, Contreras' surrender
would have alienated large segments of the military who agreed
with the DINA chief's philosophy and tactics. Pinochet's authority would then have been severely diminished and the unity of
the armed forces, a critical component of his power base, jeopardized. State Department officials believed the application of sanctions or threats in place of extradition was fruitless, if not
counter-productive. Extradition, therefore, became simply "better
than not doing anything. '2s United States prosecutors likewise
urged against visiting sanctions upon Chile. They felt obliged to
exhaust legal remedies first and then gather international support
for sanctions later on if necessary. They also hoped an extradition
hearing would at least prompt a trial of the three Chileans in

Chile.29
One commentator has suggested the United States could have
or should have - obtained the three Chilean suspects in the
same way as it did Michael TownleyY° In response to extreme
political pressure, particularly by the United States Ambassador
to Chile, Townley was produced, questioned, and deported. The
two countries bypassed extradition procedures. Townley's surren-

State for Inter-American Affairs, has said, "I made a mistake, I and others." But
McNeil asserted that he never harbored "any naive, Christian hope" that the
Chileans would be extradited. Telephone interview with Francis McNeil, Ambassador (Jan. 6, 1986).
26. Interview with Viron Vaky, former Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 18, 1985).
27. It was rumored that Contreras had shipped DINA's file on the Letelier
assassination to Germany, to be released for publication if he was extradited.
Angell, Chile After Five Years of Military Rule, 76 CURRENT HIsT. 58, 59 (1979).
28. Vaky interview, supra note 26.
29. Telephone interview with E.Lawrence Barcella, United States Attorney
(Jan. 6, 1986).
30. This seems to be the view of former Washington Post correspondent
Charles Krause, or that of his sources. Two weeks after Judge Borquez's denial,
Krause concluded, "It appears the Administration bungled the extradition request from the beginning." Krause wrote, "Had the Administration thought that
Chile's Supreme Court would not-or could not-decide the extradition case independently and fairly, it should never have put the matter before the court in
the first place. Instead it should have gone directly to Gen. Augusto Pinochet
...." Wash. Post, May 21, 1979, at A23.
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der, however, may reflect not simply an enormous exertion of unilateral pressure, but shared expectations that a national such as
Townley, employed by an allied foreign intelligence service and
wanted for a crime in his homeland, will be abandoned by that
intelligence service. Expectations about the irregular rendition or
extradition, of native, high-level intelligence officials, such as the
Chilean DINA agents, are surely different." Indeed, a State Department statement that followed the Chilean Supreme Court's
decision and that announced sanctions against Chile criticized not
that government's refusal to extradite, but "Chile's deplorable

conduct in this affair, and in particular its refusal to conduct a
full and fair investigation of this crisis. "32

31. Consider the Rainbow Warrior incident between France and New Zealand as a reflection of these expectations. On July 10, 1985, the Rainbow Warrior,the flagship of the environmental group Greenpeace that was to lead a protest flotilla against French nuclear testing at Mururora atoll, was blown up in
Auckland harbor, New Zealand by two bombs attached to its hull. One crew
member, a Portuguese-born photographer, was killed in the attack. New Zealand
authorities quickly detained Maj. Alain Mafart and Capt. Dominique Prieur,
two French intelligence officers who helped prepare the attack, and French press
reports linked the attack to the French secret service, the Direction Ggnrale de
S&curit6 Ext~rieure.
Two months later, after considerable scandal, France's Socialist government
admitted responsibility for the attack on the Rainbow Warrior. Meanwhile, in
November 1985, Mafart and Prieur pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter and began to serve their ten-year jail sentences in New Zealand.
France subsequently pressed for the release of the two intelligence officers and
even began to block wool and food imports from New Zealand. The French government argued that Mafart and Prieur had only carried out military orders.
Recently, however, New Zealand has agreed to release the two agents provided
they live for three years at the French military garrison on Hao atoll. France, in
turn, will lift its trade restrictions against New Zealand and pay the government
there $7 million in damages. According to the agreement, Mafart and Prieur,
whose families may come to live with them at the garrison, will be allowed to
leave the atoll during or before their three-year "tour" only with the permission
of both France and New Zealand. New Zealand's Prime Minister, who had likened the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior to an act of international terrorism
and who said the two agents would serve all or part of their sentences in New
Zealand, called the arrangement "an appropriate outcome, be it unexpected."
N.Y. Times, July 8, 1986, at Al.

32.

DEP'T ST. BULL.

66 (1980).
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III. PROSPECTS FOR THE FSIA AS A PARTIAL REMEDY FOR
VICTIMS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM

A.

Letelier v. Republic of Chile: Rights Created

Despite the failure of extradition, survivors of Letelier and
Moffitt did obtain significant legal relief. In August 1978, the survivors brought a wrongful death action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Chile, its secret
police (Centro Nacional de Intelligencia, formerly DINA), and
the individual defendants. 3 Jurisdiction to sue was asserted
under section 1605(a)(5) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 3' a section detailing the exceptions to sovereign immunity for

noncommercial torts.3 5 In November 1980, the district court
33. The cause of action included (1) conspiracy to deprive decedents of their
constitutional rights to equal protection of the law and freedom of speech, press,
association, and petition, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1982); (2) assault and
battery causing death; (3) negligent transportation and detonation of explosives;
(4) assassination in violation of international law; (5) assault upon an internationally protected person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 666 (D.D.C. 1980).
34. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976 (the FSIA or the Act) codified the "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity embraced by the State Department in the "Tate Letter" [Letter of
Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Department of Justice, May 19, 1952, 26
DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952)]. That letter distinguished between a foreign sovereign's public activities-for which the sovereign could claim immunity from judicial jurisdiction-and its commercial activities-for which it could not make
such a claim. The decades previous to the Act's passage witnessed uneven, unpredictable applications of the restrictive theory in the United States, in part
due to executive involvement in immunity determinations. Notably, under the
Act, United States courts alone make sovereign immunity determinations,
guided only by the conditions specified in the Act. The Act also establishes procedures to serve process on a foreign state and prescribes the conditions under
which the property of a foreign state, or that of its agencies or instrumentalities,
can be made subject to execution. See generally Carl, Suing Foreign Governments in American Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act in Practice,33 Sw. L.J. 1009 (1979); Weber, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning, and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. IN WORLD
PUBL. ORD. 1 (1976); Note, The ForeignSovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Giving the PlaintiffHis Day in Court, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 543 (1977).
35. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1605(a)(5) (1982) holds the following:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
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awarded the families five million dollars in damages.3 6 This was
the first time jurisdiction over a foreign state had been established under 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA. Letelier v. Republic of Chile
proved to be a landmark case with unanticipated results as a
means to address state-sponsored terrorism.
The focus of the case was Chile's contention that the district
court lacked the required subject matter jurisdiction both under
the FSIA and the "act of state" doctrine.3 7 The Chileans refused
to communicate their arguments to the court directly and instead
submitted them in a diplomatic note.3 Though a default judgment had already been entered against Chile for its failure to appear in person, the court nevertheless chose to take up the question of subject matter jurisdiction.
In its note, Chile denied any involvement in the Letelier killing.
Chile asserted that even if the country had been involved, the

damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment; except that this paragraph shall not apply to
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of
whether the discretion be abused or
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.
36. Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
37. The "act of state" is a judge-made rule derived from English law
whereby United States courts have refrained from considering the validity or
legality of public acts of a foreign state done within that state's territory. First
enunciated in the United States in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897),
the act of state doctrine fundamentally seeks to preserve the separation of powers and international comity. See generally, Conant, The Act of State Doctrine
and Its Exceptions: An Introduction, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1979);
Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine? 85 YALE. L.J. 597 (1976). The
FSIA, which deals solely with the issue of immunity from jurisdiction, does not
pretend to impinge upon possible applications of the act of state doctrine. However, it is possible that within an immunity determination an alleged act of state
could enter into question, as in fact it did in Letelier v. Republic of Chile. See
infra note 45 and accompanying text. On such occasions, the FSIA would seem
to require that immunity determination be made without reference to the act of
state doctrine.
38. Note No. 180 From the Embassy of Chile to the Department of State
(Aug. 14, 1979), and accompanying Annex.
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court had no subject matter jurisdiction "in that it was entitled to
immunity under the Act [FSIA], which does not cover political
39
assassinations because of their public, governmental character."
Chile, citing House and Senate reports regarding the FSIA, stated
that the exception in section 1605(a)(5) referred to private torts
such as automobile accidents. The court, however, emphasized to
Chile the "plain language" and "plain meaning" of the exemption
by stating the following:
Nowhere is there an indication that the tortious acts to which the
Act makes reference are to only be those formerly classified as
"private," thereby engrafting onto the statute, as the Republic of
Chile would have the Court do, the requirement that the character
be judicially analyzed to determine whether it was of the type
heretofore denoted as jure gestionis or should be classified as jure
40
imperii.

The court added that the Senate and the House "committees
made it quite clear that the Act is cast in general terms as applying to all tort actions for money damages so as to provide recompense for the victim of a traffic accident or other noncommercial
tort. ' 41 Any extra-statutory interpretation was foreclosed to the
court because the "bill. . . sets forth the sole and exclusive stan-

dards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the
United States. ..

.

Though Chile did not address the issue, the court next considered whether section 1605(a)(5)(A), the exemption for claims
based on discretionary acts, applied. The court noted that subsection (A) mirrored a similar exemption in the Federal Torts Claim
Act, and that in a case involving the Torts Claim Act, the United
States Supreme Court defined a discretionary act as "one in
which 'there is room for policy judgment and decision.' ",4' The
39. 488 F. Supp. at 671.
40. Id.
41. 488 F. Supp. at 672 (quoting, with emphasis, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1976) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6619-20, and S. REP. No. 1310, 94th
Cong. 2d Sess. 20-21 (1976).
42. 488 F. Supp. at 672 (quoting, with emphasis, HoUSE REPORT, supra note

41, at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6610.
43. 488 F. Supp. at 673 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36
(1953).
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court ruled, however, that such an exemption did not bar the
Letelier suit. The court stated the following:
[T]here is no discretion to commit, or to have one's officers or
agents commit an illegal act.. . . Whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, it has no "discretion" to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of
humanity as recognized in both national and international law.""
Chile's final argument was that even if the court would establish
subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, the "act of state"
doctrine prevented any judicial review of the alleged governmental acts, preparatory to the assassination, that took place in Chile
and not in the United States. The court responded that the effect
of the tort was in Washington, D.C., not Chile, and that the location of the injury precluded any application of the "act of state"
doctrine.45
As one commentator stated, "[t]he district court in Letelier
faced a relatively clean slate in construing the application of the
noncommercial torts exception.'4 The way the court wrote upon
the slate has had a number of favorable implications for world
public order. First, the court's reading and application of section
1605(a)(5) suggests that a foreign state may be sued in the United
States for damages arising from politically motivated tortious
acts. The court, directly addressing the possibility of a political
exception to the section, refused to recognize one.47 Second, the
court began to define the "discretionary function" limitation on

44.

488 F. Supp. at 673.

45. Id. at 673-74. Recent court decisions have looked beyond the statute's
plain language and required both injury and tort to occur in the United States
territory to assert jurisdiction. See Matter of Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.
Tex. 1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984);

Olsen v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 105 S.
Ct. 295 (1984); Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 247 (1984). Oft-cited support by the courts for
such a departure is the Act's legislative history, which states that "the tortious
act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the United States." HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 40, at 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
at 6619.
46. Note, The Letelier Case: Foreign Sovereign Liability for Acts of Political Assassination, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 251, 259 (1981).

47.

488 F. Supp. at 671-72.
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liability by excluding acts of political assassination and terrorism. 48 Unfortunately, the court left open the exact legal standard
for discretionary acts.49
Third, the court's decision, coming amid a political and diplomatic crisis between the United States and Chile, affirmed the
change in the national constitutive process that Congress intended the FSIA to effect: A municipal court acted as the sole
forum for making sovereign immunity decisions. Congress was
prescribing, and the court was applying, standards of immunity
a task that the State Department, because of its institutional
bias, had previously handled inconsistently.5 0 The State Department did not even file a suggestion of interest in Letelier. Fourth,
the Letelier decision could help deter kidnapping, bombings, and
similar conduct by foreign nations and their intelligence agencies
on United States soil through punishing the terrorists. Finally,
Letelier v. Republic of Chile provided the relatives of victims of
foreign-inspired offenses a forum in which to seek relief. Theoretically, other victims of offenses can use section 1605(a)(5) if they
meet its requirements. Letelier thus represents a gain for international human rights law. 51
B. Letelier v. Republic of Chile: A Remedy Denied
Though Letelier v. Republic of Chile awarded damages to the
families of the assassination victims, 5 2 the FSIA provides no sure
way of satisfying the judgment. After waiting a year during which
Chile could comply with the award, the survivors moved to serve
the judgment in federal district court for the Southern District of
New York against Chile's wholly state-owned airline, Chilean National Airline (LAN).5 3 The airline's facilities and personnel
helped the Chilean intelligence (DINA) 54 agents to carry out the
assassination.5 5 The survivors asserted jurisdiction to collect

48. Id. at 673.
49. Note, supra note 46, at 264. See 488 F. Supp. at 673.
50. Weber, supra note 34, at 13, 38-42.

51. See Note, supra note 46, at 264-65.
52. 502 F. Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
53. 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
54. Direccion de Intelligencia Nacional. Id. at 1492.
55. For more background on LAN's role, see U.S. Congress, House, Alleged
Violations of U.S. Aviation Laws and Regulations by LAN Chile Airlines, Committee on Government Operations, 96th Congress, 2nd Sess. (1980).
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under FSIA's section 1610(a)(2), which permits execution upon
the "property in the United States of a foreign state . . . if...
the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based .. .*"5 In July 1983, the district court,
having deemed LAN subject to execution based on Chile's abuse
of LAN's corporate form,M concluded that LAN's conduct in the
assassination effort did, in fact, constitute the "commercial activity upon which the claim [was] based. ' 58 On appeal, however, the
Second Circuit reversed, concluding that "under the circumstances at issue in this case Congress did in fact create a right
without a remedy. '"5 Ultimately, Letelier seems to provide testimony to the view that the FSIA is more generous than necessary
under international law in providing immunity from execution. 0
The Second Circuit concluded that LAN, as a juridical entity
distinct from Chile, could not be held accountable for the debt of
its sovereign parent.6 1 This "presumption of separateness" to
which LAN was entitled-established by the Supreme Court in
Bancec 2 and implied in the FSIA's legislative history6 3 -had not
been overcome, as the district court found, by Chile's use of the
airline facilities and personnel to help perpetrate the Letelier assassination. The court stated the following:
In our view this is not the sort of "abuse" that overcomes the presumption of separateness established by Bancec. Joint participation in a tort is not the "classic" abuse of corporate form to which
the Supreme Court referred ....None of [the] facts shows that
Chile ignored LAN's separate [juridical] status. Indeed, they simply demonstrate that Michael Townley was able to enlist the cooperation of certain LAN pilots and officials with whom he had a preexisting social relationship in pursuing his sinister goal. There was
no finding that LAN's separate status was established to shield its
owners from liability for their torts or that Chile ignored ordinary

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1982). 567 F. Supp. at 1498.
567 F. Supp. at 1494-96.
See 567 F. Supp. at 1500-03.
748 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1984).
See Weber, supra note 34, at 22-24.
748 F.2d at 790.

62. First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba
(Bancec), 462 U.S. 611, 626-27 (1983); 748 F.2d at 794.

63. 748 F.2d at 793-74 (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6628-29).

41, at 29-30, re-
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corporate formalities."

Ordinarily, the court would have remanded for further evidentiary hearings on Chile's abuse of LAN's corporate form. But even
if the presumption of LAN's separate juridical existence could be
overcome, the court went on to argue that section 1610(a)(2), the
commercial activities exception to execution immunity, would
prohibit the attachment of LAN's assets. The court noted the apparent contradiction of "tort" creditors such as Letelier and Moffitt trying to collect under such an exception. The court stated,
"If the district court in the District of Columbia lifted jurisdictional immunity based on its finding that the activities complained of were tortious, not commercial, it is inconsistent for this
court to lift execution immunity based on a finding that the activities were commercial."65
In addition, the court found that the FSIA required inquiry
into the "essential nature," 66 not just certain aspects, of an activity to determine if the activity were commercial for purposes of
execution. In essence, LAN's activities could not be considered
commercial. The court of appeals acknowledged that "[c]arriage
of passengers and packages [was] an activity in which a private
person could engage," 68 and thus suggestive of commercial activity. The court, however, following the decision in Arango,69
charged that LAN's alleged role in transporting and assisting
Townley would be unlawful activity and thus not commercial.
Such noncommercial activity formed the basis of the plaintiffs'
70

claim.

Finally, the court of appeals stated that if section 1610(a)(2)
deprived the creditors of a remedy, the absence of a remedy conformed to the international community's preference for broad immunity from execution upon state property. Congress took that
preference into account when drafting the FSIA, particularly section 1610(a)(2). 71 A final footnote suggested, with some skepti-

64. 748 F.2d at 794.
65. Id. at 795.
66. Id. at 796 (quoting HousE REPORT, supra note 41, at 16, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6615).
67. 748 F.2d at 796.
68. Id. at 797.
69. Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
70. 748 F.2d at 797-98.
71. Id. at 798.
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cism, the following "other remedies": Chile could decide to honor
States could file the judgment before
the judgment or the United
72
an international tribunal.
The implications of the Second Circuit's decision in Letelier
are ominous. Following Letelier, participation by a national airline (or by any other entity "the property of a foreign state") in a
political assassination on United States soil could not be commercial activity. Consequently, no matter how "abused" by its sovereign parent, this property would remain insulated from executions. One cannot, however, accuse the court of misapplying
section 1610(a)(2) or of failing to have read the exception "more
flexibly."
Letelier does not imply that the FSIA bars a remedy for acts of
state-sponsored terrorism against which FSIA judgments have already been entered. The appellate court limited itself to section
1610(a)(2). Other execution immunity exceptions in the FSIA
could provide a remedy. 3 Still, the availability of any exception

72.

Id. at 799 n.4.

73. Collection may be possible, for example, under § 1610(a)(5) of the FSIA,
which allows execution upon property of a foreign state if "the property consists

of any contractual obligation or any proceeds from such a contractual obligation
to indemnify or hold harmless the foreign state or its employees under a policy
of automobile or other liability or casualty insurance covering the claim which
merged into the judgment." Most states, of course, do not have "terrorism insurance." However, counsel for plaintiffs in Letelier v. Republic of Chile has
written:
[T]he pleader can provide for every contingency by drafting the complaint
artfully. Bombings, shootings, harassment, and coercive conduct involve
international infliction of harm upon the plaintiff, but the conduct often
creates a reckless or negligent risk of harm to others than the intended
victim. A complaint drafted to include allegations of such reckless or negligent conduct would enhance the plaintiff's chances to collect if, as is sometimes the case, the foreign state has an insurance policy that broadly insures its agents for nonintentional torts, in the pattern of any standard
liability policy.
Tigar, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Pursued Refugee: Lessons from Letelier v. Chile, MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 421, 437-38 (1982).
Also, § 1610(b)(2) of the FSIA, dealing with the property of a foreign state's
agencies and instrumentalities involved in commercial activities in the United
States, restricts execution immunity more than § 1610(a)(20) does. Section
1610(b)(2) allows for execution against "any property in the United States...
if -.

.

. the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumental-

ity is not immune by virtue of section 1605(a)(2),(3), or (5), . . regardless of
whether the property is or was used for the activity upon which the claim is
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to judgment creditors in such cases as Letelier is so dubious that
Congress may wish to reconsider this aspect of the FSIA.
The appellate court's remarks that section 1610(a)(2) has an international legal basis are also unfortunate. Section 1610(a)(2)
hardly reflects state practice in the field of execution immunity.
While international law appears to permit execution of judgments
against state property used for commercial purposes, 7 4 section
1610(a)(2) may exceed minimum standards by withdrawing immunity on the condition that the property be used for the commercial activity which gave rise to the claim.7 5 The appellate
court's assertions will limit, if not completely stifle, the muchneeded debate about the FSIA's execution provisions.
IV.

ARGENTINA'S EXTRADITION REQUEST FOR TOWNLEY: SHOULD

THERE

BE A HUMANITARIAN EXCEPTION?

In May 1983 Argentina filed an extradition request for Michael
Vernon Townley, long suspected of having orchestrated a car
bombing in Buenos Aires in 1974 in which former Chilean general
Carlos Prats Gonzalez and his wife were killed. The United States
cooperated with the request, and arrested Townley after his
shortened United States prison term.
On July 25, however, federal magistrate W. Harris Grimsley rejected the request, barring Townley's return to Argentina to face
separate murder charges. Grimsley ruled, in effect, that the arguments of the Justice Department on behalf of Argentina failed to
convince him of probable cause "independent of statements he

based (emphasis added). However, precisely because of its greater restrictiveness, this exception would seem to discourage a foreign sovereign who is bent on
assassinating a United States-based refugee only from employing an agency or
instrumentality in the deed, not necessarily from going forward with the deed

itself.
74.

See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE

§ 69 reporter's note (1965) and Lauterpacht, The Problem of
JurisdictionalImmunities of Foreign States, 1951 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 241UNITED STATES

43.

75. One commentator writes: "The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 appears not only to be consonant with but also to go beyond the minimum
immunity from execution required by international law.. . . [E]ight states Austria, Belgium, pre-W[orld] W[ar] II Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Italy, the
. . have not created exceptions for
Netherlands, Singapore, and Switzerland -.
property unrelated to the judgement being executed ... " WEBER, supra note

34, at 22-23.

1986]

TERRORISM, EXTRADITION & FSIA RELIEF,
THE LETELIER CASE

75

[Townley] had given in 1978 . .. when he reached his plea bargain in the Letelier case." This plea bargain provided Townley
with "immunity from further prosecution." The plea bargain did
not, of course, explicitly protect Townley against extradition. But,
Magistrate Grimsley said, "it would be 'unfair' and 'complete hypocrisy' for the [United States] to permit a foreign nation to use
information Townley supplied prosecutors in reaching the plea
bargain.... The magistrate said his decision was based on 'a

sovereign nation giving its word.'

"76

One argument advanced by lawyers seeking to bar Townley's
extradition was that Argentina's embattled political system could
not protect their client from Chileans or Argentines who wanted
to kill him.7 7 Although this argument was never addressed by the
court, it raises a critical debate about international criminal
procedure.
Humanitarian claims 7 8 such as the ones Townley's defense lawyers raised are not mentioned in the United States-Argentine Extradition Treaty of 1972,' 9 or, for that matter, in most United
76. Wash. Post, July 26, 1983 at Al. An argument raised by defense lawyers,
but unaddressed by the court, was that United States cooperation with the Argentine extradition request was prohibited according to the Silbert-Montero
agreement signed before Townley's expulsion from Chile in 1978. Supra note 6.
A strict reading of the agreement seems to invalidate that argument. The information ban in the agreement seemed to limit itself to "actions by Chilean nationals in the United States." The agreement said nothing of information about
actions of Townley, an American national, outside the United States. Thus, the
agreement may not have precluded United States obligations to abide by its
extradition treaty with Argentina. The alleged crimes for which Townley was
requested took place in Argentina. In addition, Silbert-Montero is not an executive agreement and has no force of law.
77. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1983, at A6.
78. Anderson specifies three types of humanitarian claims: (1) that "the trial
in the requesting state will be or was unfair;" (2) "that the awaiting punishment
will be excessive or cruel;" and (3) "that the requesting country will be unable to
or does not intend to protect the requested person from assassination attempts."
Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition Proceedings: An Argument for a HumanitarianException, in MICH. Y.B. OF INT'L
LEGAL STUD.

153, 154 (1983).

79. See supra note 9. But art. 8 of the United States-Argentine extradition
treaty requires a pledge from the requesting state that the death penalty will
not be used for an offense for which the death penalty cannot be imposed in the
requested state. Id. at 3511. Also, art. 6 allows the requested country to ask the
requesting country to withdraw its extradition request for a person under 18
years of age with permanent residence in the requested country if "the compe-
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States extradition treaties with other countries.8 0 Nor have humanitarian exceptions been recognized or dealt with by United
States courts in extradition proceedings. The 1901 case of Neeley
v. Henkel"1 articulates the courts' stance on this matter. The Supreme Court stated that United States Constitutional provisions
"have no relation to crimes committed without the jurisdiction of
'82 Part of
the United States against the laws of a foreign country.
the basis of the courts' position lay in the absence of any municipal mandate to review the conditions of punishment and legal
processes of the requesting state.8 3 But the traditional position of
non-inquiry principally reflected the judiciary's deference to the
executive's foreign affairs power. 84 Many extradition cases have
international and diplomatic overtones; judicial application of humanitarian standards could risk condemning the criminal justice
system of the requesting state and damage or exacerbate relations

between requested and requesting party.
In light of the principle of non-inquiry, the courts have usually
reserved humanitarian judgments for the executive, who exercises
ultimate discretion in surrendering relators found extraditable."5
Yet the Department of State, several scholars have contended,"'

tent authorities of that country determine that extradition would prejudice the
social readjustment and rehabilitation of that person." Id. at 3509.
80. But see Convention on Extradition, Oct. 24, 1961, United States-Sweden,
art. V, Para. 6, 14 U.S.T. 1845, T.I.A.S. No. 5496, which prohibits extradition
"[i]f in the specific case it is found to be obviously incompatible with the requirements of humane treatment, because of, for example, the youth or health
of the person sought, taking into account also the nature of the offense and the
interests of the requesting State."
81. Neeley v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
82. Id. at 122.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982), which codifies the magistrate's obligations in
United States extradition hearings.
84. See, e.g., Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980), in which the court held that the relators' claim that they would face torture and possible death in a Mexican prison - was
outside its jurisdiction. The court, id. at 1107, quoted from Sindone v. Grant,
419 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980): "[T]he degree of risk to ...life from extradition is an issue that properly falls within the exclusive purview of the executive
branch." See also Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 869 (1972).
85. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1982). For a discussion of the origins of executive
discretion, see C.

BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC

ORDER 531-34 (1974).
86.

See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 78, at 160-62. See also BASSIOUNI, supra
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has never considered itself empowered to review and invoke humanitarian claims. Rather, it has seen itself bound by treaty obligations (which do not include humanitarian exceptions); any discretion it has exercised has involved treaty-interpretation. The
result is that today "there is the serious possibility that a bona
fide claim of unfair treatment would not receive adequate consideration by either the judicial or executive branch." '
The Townley case seemed to raise this very possibility. In Argentina's commitment to rid itself of military politics and rightist
ideology, and in light of its historically competitive and strained
relationship with Chile, Michael Townley, if extradited, could
have faced unfair treatment or have been given insufficient police
protection. Townley's albeit tenous claim might have gone overlooked by both the judiciary and the executive, the latter perhaps
eager not to offend Argentina's new democracy. Thus, however
noxious his crimes, Townley's humanitarian plea does prompt
questions about the lack of institutionalized extradition procedures that protect human rights-in this case, the rights of the
accused.
Anderson has asserted that "although recent humanitarian
claims by relators may not have warranted an application of the
exception, that does not invalidate the need for its incorporation
into the extradition procedure."8 " One means of incorporation
would be to write a humanitarian exception into the United
States municipal extradition statute. The argument favoring such
a change is that the judiciary, less subject than the executive to
foreign policy pressures, is better qualified than the executive to
assess humanitarian claims.8 9 Although the courts seem to be the
appropriate forum in which to resolve humanitarian questions,
however, their competence in examining and evaluating the legalpolitico conditions relating to humanitarian claims cannot be
taken for granted. The courts could conduct primary research
into each relator's claim only at great expense and delay-costs
which may defeat justice and encourage states to engage in more
note 85, at 533. See generally Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62

COLUM. L. REV. 1313 (1962).
87. Anderson, supra note 78, at 153-54.
88. Id. at 164 (footnote omitted).
89.

This argument is made by Wise, Some Problems of Extradition, 15

WAYNE L. REV. 709, 722-23
TIONAL LAW 197 (1971).

(1969) and by I.

SHEARER, ExTRADITION IN INTERNA-
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abusive forms of apprehending fugitive offenders. Also, judicial
applications of the humanitarian exceptions could become as
politicized and uncertain as applications of the political offense
exception, and presumably a denial on humanitarian grounds
would be as non-appealable as any other denial by a United
States extradition magistrateY°
Another alternative, adding humanitarian exceptions to extradition treaties themselves, could produce the same costs created
by a revision of the federal extradition statute. However, it may
be possible to incorporate into those treaties an exception for
cruel and unusual punishment.9 1
A final alternative could be to formulate a multilateral (or regional) convention on extradition that provides for the imposition
of minimal criminal procedural standards and other humanitarian
safeguards or establishes a mechanism for handling humanitarian
claims.9 2 Accomplishing the latter might involve giving the judiciaries of signatory states permission to forward humanitarian
claims to a larger body, e.g., an Inter-American Court for Human
Rights, for an advisory opinion. Such an impartial mechanism
could shield both judiciary and executive of a requested state
from the onus of potentially embarrassing extradition denials and
also diffuse bilateral tensions arising from a particular extradition
case that involves a bona fide humanitarian claim.
One might argue, however, that all these means of incorpora-

90. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-30 (2d Cir. 1981).
91. A number of multilateral conventions and human rights declarations already protect against such treatment. Instituting "extradite or prosecute" obligations in such cases into extradition treaties may be practicable. See BASSIOUNI,
supra note 85, at 463-466.
92. This suggestion is derived from Lillich, Model American Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Serious Forms of Violence, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
662 (1983) (the Convention is reprinted at 664). Article 1 enumerates the several
offenses which are encompassed by the Model Convention. Id. at 664-65. Article
9 reads:

Upon receipt of a request for extradition for an offense included in Article
1, a Contracting State may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court

of Human Rights pursuant to Article 64 of the American Convention on
Human Rights for an advisory opinion as to whether granting the request

for extradition would violate the provisions of this Convention. In like
manner, a Contracting Party, which has made a request for extradition for
an offense included in Article 1, may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court for an advisory opinion.
Id. at 667.
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tion are costly and impracticable and that the current system of
non-inquiry and discretion in United States extradition procedure
can reconcile human rights with international criminal justice. In
dramatic humanitarian cases-and, indeed, in undramatic
ones-the executive and the judiciary have the capacity to prove
sympathetic and flexible.93 For the fugitive whose humanitarian
claim may overlap a "political offense" claim, the political offense
exception still remains. For extraditable nationals of a requested
state who fear harsh prison treatment in the requesting state,
prisoner exchange programs may be the answer. In addition, the
lack of an institutionalized humanitarian exception may serve in
a small way to deter crime, signaling to potentially fugitive offenders there is one less escape route from extradition. As it now
93.

For example, when Venezuela requested the extradition of former dicta-

tor Perez Jimenez from the United States, Perez Jimenez claimed he would not
receive a fair trial. Only after the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States
guaranteed "to protect the right of an accused to full and effective defense," the
right to counsel, and to a speedy trial did then-Secretary of State Dean Rusk
allow his extradition. 49 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 1262, at 364, 365-67 (1963). In some
cases the Department of State has justified a denial of extradition on treaty
grounds when there may have been a humanitarian basis for denial. See, e.g.,
Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 362 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (denial of habeas
corpus petition in extradition proceeding), rev'd and remanded, 486 F.2d 442
(2d Cir. 1973), on remand, 401 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (petition again
denied), aff'd, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 833 (1976).
Just as the Secretary of State has denied extradition in would-be humanitarian cases on treaty grounds, so have the courts sometimes denied it on different
grounds. See discussions of Ex parte Fudera, Ex parte LaMantia, and In re
Mylonas in BASSIOUNI, supra note 85, at 528-29. Finally, a court expressed some
disenchantment with the principle of strict noninquiry in the Gallina dictum. In
Gallina v. Fraser,a 1960 case, the relator had been tried and convicted in absentia in Italy for armed robbery. Before the court of appeals Gallina contended
that if extradited to Italy, he would go directly to prison without retrial and
would be unable "to face his accusers or to conduct any defense." 278 F.2d 77,
78 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960). Judge Waterman affirmed the
denial by the district court of a writ of habeas corpus, but stated:
[W]e have discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await the relator upon
extradition. .

.

. Nevertheless, we confess to some disquiet at this result.

We can imagine situations when the relator, upon extradition, would be
subject to procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's
sense of decency to require re-examination of the principle set out above.
278 F.2d at 78, 79.
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stands, the extradition regime is struggling to provide simplicity,
order, and mutual trust. Introducing humanitarian exceptions
may threaten these values; implementing them may be one problem the law, a blunt instrument, should avoid.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Letelier incident reminds us that having a state extradite
officers of its own intelligence service for an act of transnational
terror simply may be too much to ask. Unless the officers acted
independently or are "disposable," they will not be treated as international criminals and surrendered. Rather, they will be regarded as loyal agents of the state whose extradition would demoralize other agents and would admit of state responsibility.
Even "ordinary" terrorists receive the protection that intelligence
and other officials acting under the color of the state implicitly
enjoy, and sometimes receive it most explicitly.9 4 As extradition
abounds with procedural and substantive loopholes, courts will
find a way, as the Chilean Supreme Court did, to block both extradition and local prosecution.
Why, then, bother to request extradition in cases of state-sponsored terrorism where the evidence is overwhelmingly indicting
and where it would defy credulity to believe the requested state
would risk the consequences of extradition? Practitioners of foreign policy confronting such situations may come to decide that
extradition is the only course of action. They may also reason
that exhausting extradition procedures first will enable them to
make a better case for sanctions later. These arguments are made
and applied with certain risks, however. First, submitting an extradition request doomed to rejection perverts the extradition
process at least as much as the requested state's refusal does appearances to the contrary. Second, international and internal
support for effective sanctions following an expected extradition
denial may not be forthcoming. Indeed, support may be demobilized: a state's calls for punitive action, in explicit condemnation

94. In rejecting the United States' extradition request for PLO leader Mohammed Abbas, who was suspected of masterminding the 1985 hijacking of the
Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, Yugoslavia, through its Foreign Minister, said:
"Mohammed Abbas is a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization,
which Yugoslavia recognizes as the only legitimate representative of the Palestine people, and as such he enjoys diplomatic immunity." Wash. Post, Oct. 18,
1985, at A3, col. 3.
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of an extradition process that state freely chose to engage, tend to
lose their resonance. Third, to seek extradition continuously in
these cases encourages the exportation of political violence. Deterring state-sponsored terrorism requires more than the imperfect threat of extradition; it requires the capability and the willingness to take meaningful, permissible reprisales.9 5 Otherwise,
preventing attacks like the one on Letelier will depend almost exclusively on counterterrorist intelligence.
The FSIA, through its little-known noncommercial torts exception, could aid deterrence against foreign state terror on United
States territory. Under U.S.C. § 1609(a)(5), a state could be sued
for acts of political assassination if plaintiffs can succeed in com-

95. Their effectiveness notwithstanding, economic and diplomatic sanctions
and international legal claims could be brought to bear against a responsible
state. See Murphy, State Self-Help and Problems of Public Internationallaw,
in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM

565 (A. Evans

and J. Murphy

eds. 1978).
Armed reprisals, permitted under customary international law, are commonly
believed to be prohibited under modern international law. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 281 (1963); 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-16 (1971). Also, the U.N. Security

Council has condemned armed reprisals generally as "incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations." S.C. Res. 188 (1964). Further,
according to the Declaration on Principles of Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, "[s]tates have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisals involving the use
of force." G.A./Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
Nevertheless, this norm seems to have eroded somewhat - as indicated by
state practice and by some Security Council decisions - and scholars have argued for a limited rehabilitation of armed reprisals. See R. LILLICH, R. FALK, The
Beirut Raid, and the InternationalLaw of Retaliation, 63 Amt. J. INT'L L. 440
(1969); Forcible Self-Help under InternationalLaw, 22 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 59;
R.Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
595 (1972). Contemporary international terrorism, which is often encouraged or
directed by states and overwhelmingly involves repeated hit-and-run attacks
against the nationals of liberal states, has put the absolute prohibition against
reprisals under enormous strain. In this contract - one state's reprisals may be
another's self-defense. On last April's U.S. raid on Tripoli and Benghazi in response to Libya's role in attacks on U.S. personnel and installations, for example, see Sofaer, Terrorismand the Law 64 FOREIGN AFF. 919 (Summer, 1986). Indepth studies of this and similar "retaliatory" raids or strikes will shed much
light on states' normative expectations regarding cross-border coercion in response to terrorist attacks.
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piling sufficient evidence of the state's involvement. This possibility may not thwart certain states, such as Libya, from policing
and even killing dissident exiles in the United States, but it
would cause other states to pause before ordering an assassination. If the FSIA allowed for execution of a judgment against a
broader range of commercial property owned by a foreign state in
the United States, then the leaders of such states might think
twice. Then, too, persons who have been awarded a judgment
under 1605(a)(5) but barred by current execution provisions from
collecting the judgment, would be provided with a complete
remedy.

